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An Institutional Economic Appraisal of Worker Equity Schemes in Agriculture:  






The institutional economic appraisal conducted in this paper confirms that equity schemes are subject 
to institutional incompleteness as proposed in ICT. The incompleteness stem from the lack of 
verifiability related to social capital, embeddedness, governance and micro performance. In addition, 
they lack the requisite ex ante incentives to enable ex post adaptation, counterveilance over 
opportunism, and the distribution of residual claims and control. The first reason for incompleteness 
emanate from the motivations of the initiators, which is opportunism by landowners to secure their 
assets in the face of uncertainty and/or enhance their returns in the marketplace. The lack of worker 
effort and options in the early stages raises credible commitment questions. Examining the governance 
aspects of equity schemes reveal that they are consistent with modern trends to separate ownership and 
control. However, a key concern is the asymmetry in human capital and subsequently in power, 
residual control, gratification, and ultimately economic empowerment. The analysis is aimed at 
identifying the incentives and innovations required to make equity schemes, as a type of shareholder 
contract, more complete and credible in an empowerment context. Recommendations towards 
institutional innovation are offered. 
 
1. Introduction 
The importance of institutional innovation as a key determinant of economic growth has received much 
attention in economic literature. Joseph Schumpeter in particular was concerned with this in issue and 
the key role of the entrepreneur whose innovations advances growth (Demsetz, 2000). Arthur Lewis 
(1955) later gave further attention to the institutional factors in society that affect or determine 
economic performance such as property rights, population, capital, etc. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) later 
introduced the concept of ‘induced innovations’ where they argue that institutional changes tend to 
follow the price mechanism. More recent work relate to the innovations occurring in firms and 
industries that enhances global competitiveness (Best, 1990; Porter, 1990).  
 
In South Africa the debate on institutional innovation is largely fueled by the socio-political imperative 
to effect greater equity in the economy. This policy is further guided by a growth with equity strategy. 
For agriculture, this implied (inter alia) a focus on partnerships, contracts, joint ventures and the like. 
Agricultural workers were best positioned as a target group for empowerment given their prevailing 
human (vocational) capital. Farmworker Equity Schemes (FES) thus emerged similar to Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP’s) common in other industries. Whereas ESOPS’s appear to have labour 
productivity gains as it key objective, FES also has empowerment objectives. In FES workers hold 
acquire shares collectively obtained with state grants. Third party investors are often involved, 
including others who qualify for state grants, black professionals/entrepreneuers, private investors, or 
equity wharehousing financiers. 
 
The research is based on the authors’ participation, observations and evaluations of about twelve FES 
over the last five years. This involved several project visits, stakeholder interviews, reports to 
government departments (Land Affairs, Water Affairs) and mentorship to selected schemes and key 
individuals over this period. The research was prompted by continuous inquiries into the effectiveness, 
and economic empowerment merits of FES. The reporting on this is mixed and void of an appropriate 
framework for such appraisal. This paper is an attempt to present such a framework from the domain of 
institutional economics to ensure that the evaluation is theoretically founded, sound and objective. This 
is then applied in analysis to identify the aspects requiring further attention to improve the 
empowerment model. The development of the conceptual model  is eclectic drawing on theory from 
across economics and social sciences. The analytical emphasis is on the extent to which the 
occurrences witnessed conform to economic theory as opposed to an empirical basis. Further, empirical 
work could well draw on the conceptual framework developed in this paper. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework for appraising economic institutions is derived from Williamson (1999) as 
discussed in Karaan (2002a). This involves a three-tier analysis of economic institutions: (i) social 
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capital, (ii) governance and (iii) marginal conditions. The discussion in this section follows in this 
fashion. Social capital is first addressed including the power and control aspects.  The focus then shifts 
to governance issues including: ownership and control, incomplete contracts and empowerment. 
Finally, the more conventional neo-classical aspects are addressed by tending to issues related to 
worker incentives, and finance. This methodology is certainly not exhaustive but the aspects addressed 
were selected on the basis of their relevance to Equity Schemes being appraised. This type of 
descriptive and deductive institutional economic analysis is uncommon in agricultural economics and 
agribusiness, and must be seen as an attempt to pioneer such institutional analysis (ex post) to enable 
agricultural economist to improve their understanding of institutions. The advances of the NIE in 
agribusiness studies and the recent work of prominent scholars like Alan Schmid (Robison, Scmid & 
Barry, 2002) and others, clearly indicate the necessity of adding this type of analysis to the repertoire of 
methods/approaches. 
 
2.1 Social Capital 
Social capital is increasingly acknowledged as a critical aspect in institutional economic analysis. It 
refers to the features of social organization such as trust, norms, and networks, and can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam, 1993). Schmid et al (2002) have 
eloquently commenced the debate on the role of social capital (SC) in the industrialization of the food 
system. Extensive work on social capital and embeddedness, and the implied path dependency in 
Africa, is found in the work of Fafchamps (1999). SC can be considered a ‘moral resources’ that 
increase with use and deplete when not used which means that it can have virtuous or vicious cycles. It 
is a public good as opposed to conventional capital, which is a private good. It often gets produced as a 
by-product of other social activities.  Trust is one key manifestation of SC and arises out of two related 
sources: (i) norms of reciprosity, and (ii) networks of engagement (Putnam 1993). Groups with 
productive norms of reciprosity (i.e. dense networks of social exchange) are more efficient in 
constraining opportunism and resolve problems of collective action. Networks of 
exchange/engagement can be formal or informal, vertical or horizontal. These networks (clubs, 
societies, associations etc.) can be intense horizontal forms of engagement that can be a vital source of 
social capital in the following ways: (i) they increase the cost to defectors in prisoner’s dilemma 
situations, (ii) foster robust forms of reciprosity or acceptable behaviour, (iii) improve information 
flows about trustworthiness, and (iv) provide a template for c ontinued engagement based on past 
successes. On the contrary, vertical networks are less successful in sustaining trust and cooperation 
irrespective of its density.  Here, information flows are less reliable since subordinates hog information 
as a hedge against exploitation. In institutional analysis however, the existence of distrust is more 
important than trust. It is also difficult to impose sanctions against opportunism and are less likely to be 
imposed upwards and more likely downwards. SC also manifests as sacred symbols, attachment value, 
sympathy, empathy, and other non-economic features. It can also be bonding (within a group) or cross-
cutting (across diversity). Groups who lack financial capital often revert to creating SC in an attempt to 
enhance upward mobility and power. 
 
2.1.1 Collectivism and individualism 
The historical analysis of Greif (1997) provides an explanation for the evolution of the firm when 
embedded in a collectivist or individualist circumstances.  Historically, in both societies there was an 
initial reliance on the family firm, which served to reduce transaction costs.  However, the further 
historical development differs starkly.  In collectivist societies there is little incentive for introducing an 
organisational form that reduces the likelihood of forced separations.  In individualist societies 
individual firms became family firms, but family members eventually became replaced by external 
investors, and meant that equity became tradable.  This implies a separation of ownership and control, 
which required appropriate institutions to surmount contractual problems. It is clear that in the 
industrialised commercial sector the trend is toward individualism and alienation of equity from the 
traditional family firm. In the developing sector however, collectivist traits are more observed largely 
for purposes of increasing bargain power and gaining social capital given the lack of financial capital. 
 
2.1.2. Power 
It was stated that ownership implies rights over residual control of assets a nd residual income (or 
losses). A more difficult notion to understand is authority. Coase (1937) in his seminal article argued 
that authority is the key coordinating mechanism in the firm and justifies the existence of firms. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) however, questioned the source of authority in firms. Employer-employee 
relations are governed through authority with reciprocal loyalty and obedience, which is not necessarily 
the case in inter-firm (contract) relations (Masten, 1988). The source of authority is seated in control   3 
over assets (Hart, 1995) and longer-term sustainability. Workers tend to show loyalty and allegiance to 
gain goodwill to secure their contractual relation with the firm, but tend to have shorter-term vision and 
expectations. A distinction must also be made between formal and real authority. Aghion and Tirole (in 
Hart, 1995) advanced the idea that someone with superior knowledge may have effective power so that 
those with legal power follow his/her advice. It may also be in the interest of owners to deliberately 
create an asymmetry of information so subordinates may wield power to the advantage of the firm (i.e. 
intermediate/delegated authority). Intermediate forms of ownership are further discussed by Holstrom 
and Tirole (1991). These  various forms of ownership and power reminds of Galbraith’s theory of 
counterveiling power (Williams, 2001), which in this instance would require examining the extent to 
which workers are able to wield such power in the face of the economic power of the capital strong 
partner. This would indicate the level of maturity of the venture. This theory is particularly relevant 
given that workers should be able to exercise political power given their lack of economic power. 
 
2.1.3 Embeddedness 
Institutions are embedded in circumstances shaped by history and the characteristics of stakeholders 
which frame the environment. Agricultural institutions viewed in the context of race and inequality 
tends to epitomise ‘paternalism’. In his extensive work in this domain Alston (2000) finds that this 
notion comes at a real cost to labour who often pay for this ‘privilege’.  Farmworkers are often 
embedded in dependency relations with employers for non-wage goods and services, which render 
them vulnerable to opportunism and influencing. The history of slavery cannot be ignored for its ability 
to impose a kind of moral overload (Kuran, 1998) representing worker gratification in this context. The 
question of race has also been acknowledged in the context of inequality and labour preference. Gary 
Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973) have shown how employers would sacrifice profits in favour of a 
preferred racial composition of labour. Agricultural relations also tend to be embedded in sentimental 
attachments to land and physical location. This constitutes emotional goods and attachment value that 
implicitly influences economic decisions.  
 
2.2 Governance 
2.2.1 Ownership and Control 
The separation of ownership and control is a subject afforded much attention in economics literature, 
but has found greater application outside of agriculture. The industrialization of agriculture and the 
increased cost of land perhaps reopened the debate in agriculture. Generally, the theories of the firm 
commenced by Coase (1937) are considered best able to address the issue. The theory of contracts and 
agency become particularly relevant and can be traced to Alchian and Demsetz (1972). They 
emphasised the use of contractual arrangements in appraising the role of management and their reward 
when efficient in monitoring labour. Jensen and Meckling (1976) advanced this and proposed that 
contracts are mechanisms whereby principals could monitor agents. Fama and Jensen (1983) examined 
the role of specialised manager decision-makers who may gain residual claims on firms.  
 
Studies in agriculture in this domain initially focussed on the economics of sharecropping. More recent 
studies began to focus on the nature and role of management in agribusiness firms, including 
Roumasset & Uy, (1987), Gallacher et al, (1994), and Ravenscroft, et al, (1999). Studies conducted in 
an African and developing country contexts have mainly focused on contract farming (Minot 1986; 
Glover 1990; Glover and Kusterer 1990; Porter and Philips-Howard 1997; Delgado, 1999; Karaan, 
2002, Masuku,  et al, 2002). Institutional innovations such as contracts provide testimony that the 
industrialization and globalisation of agriculture will encourage greater institutional dynamism and the 
subsequent mutations of business models. Economic empowerment has to be considered against this 
backdrop despite the relative lack of evidence, as it is anticipated that agribusinesses will mimic the 
institutional innovations occurring in the rest of industry. Hence, the key question here is whether 
worker equity schemes genuinely constitute such innovation, and if so, what insights can institutional 
economic theory provide to improve them. 
 
2.2 Incomplete contracting 
A central proposition in this paper is that worker equity schemes as economic institutions are subject to 
incomplete contracting and the concomitant ‘ remediableness’ criterion advanced by Williamson 
(1985). This suggests that the prevailing nature of this institution must be imperfect given that it is still 
at an early stage in its evolutionary development. In addition it suffers from missing markets required 
to support its economic advancement. The purpose is then to examine the nature of this incompleteness 
in order to identify the aspects that need to be addressed so that the institution can progress to greater 
maturity, if possible.   4 
 
The theory of incomplete contracting was pioneered by Oliver Hart (Grossman and Hart, 1986) but 
inspired by Williamson’s initial insights. Hart departed from the Coasian premise that firms arise when 
people write incomplete contracts and proposes that the allocation of power and control subsequently 
become necessary. Contracts are essentially incomplete due to bounded rationality, and non-
verifiability of relevant variables. It is thus accepted that contracts are perpetually renegotiated and 
redesigned to gain greater efficacy despite the renegotiation cost. These notions of contractual 
incompleteness and power can be used in understanding economic institutions and arrangements, 
despite Tirole’s (1999) objections to this claim. Incomplete Contract Theory (ICT) attempts to 
formalise the hold-up problem identified in transaction cost theory by considering the notion of 
residual rights of control in the allocation property rights ( ex post). Hart (1995) claims that this 
approach, especially the inclusion of power, goes beyond the conventional modes of studying 
economic institutions such as general equilibrium theory, game theory, principal-agent theory, and 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The latter is closest to Hart’s framework due to its emphasis on 
the costs of writing contracts and the consequent contractual incompleteness.  
 
ICT and TCE are complimentary, and their main difference lies in their treatment of contractual 
analysis. TCE emphasises institutional adaptation whereas in ICT  the emphasis is on incentives 
(Saussier, 2000). In ICT the contract role is to minimise ex ante investment distortions that may affect 
the distributable surplus ex post.   In TCE the contract has two goals: (i) it is an incentive tool to 
encourage investment and (ii) it is a tool that promotes rapid ex post adaptations to enjoy residual rights 
(Brousseau and Fares, 2000). The basic proposition in TCE is that the variety of contracts elucidates 
the search for adequate organisational responses to differences in the attributes of transactions (asset 
specificity, frequency, uncertainty), which they monitor. TCE however neglects the role of power and 
the acknowledgement that institutions are designed to allocate power among agents (Hart, 1985). 
Dietrich (1994) provides a more detailed critique of transaction cost economics and encourages moving 
beyond this theory, revisiting Schumpeterian approaches and the principles of ‘Just-in-Time’ 
management (Karaan 2002a). 
 
Four aspects are particularly relevant when considering incomplete contracts: (i) ownership, (ii) the 
boundaries of firms, (iii) securities, and (iv) power distribution (Sausier, 2000). The former, (i) and (ii) 
refer to property rights, which is concerned with why ownership of assets (human and physical) 
matters? Generally ownership matters because it provides power when contracts are incomplete. In 
addition, ownership allows residual control i.e. the right to decide about asset use outside of a given 
contract. Conventionally ownership allows appropriation of residual income i.e. entrepreneurial profit. 
Hart (1995) makes several observations about ownership or property rights. First, an agent is likely to 
own an asset if he/she has an important investment decision (e.g. use, productivity, maintenance, etc.). 
Second, complimentary assets tend to fall under common ownership whilst independent assets tend to 
be separately owned. Third, increasing returns to scale encourages larger firms. Fourth, industries early 
in their development favour large integrated firms, which over time become de-integrated as industries 
become more successful (Stigler, 1951). Fifth, a firm’s non-human assets bind firms together (asset 
specificity). Six, control over non-human assets brings control over human assets. 
 
2.3 Empowerment 
Empowerment is defined by Blanchard  et al (1999) as the process of releasing the knowledge, 
experience and motivational power of individuals. Empowerment models can be assessed in terms of 
the creation of physical and human capital. This is again used in addressing the Fundamental Economic 
Problem of unlimited human needs and limited resources that encourage trade. The litmus test for 
economic empowerment is therefore whether an asset is created or transferred that can be traded in the 
open economy. In an institutional and poverty context, empowerment is defined as “the expansion of 
assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold 
accountable institutions that affect their lives” (Narayan, 2002). The definitions above direct the 
attention to (i) developing human capabilities (i.e. human capital) and (ii) availing a tradable asset, as 
prerequisites for economic empowerment. In the approach to developing human capital one should 
discern between capabilities aimed at upliftment and those aimed at entrepreneurship since all human 
capital does not translate into entrepreneurship. Upliftment and entrepreneurship could be sequential or 
parallel. It is thus argued that the entrepreneurial process can be considered a three tier process 
commencing with: (i) upliftment efforts to establish a first threshold of human capital in the TW 
Schultz (1961) tradition, (ii) the availing of a tradable economic asset to enable economic activity, and 
(iii) venting entrepreneurship in the Schumpeterian tradition.   5 
 
2.3 Marginal Conditions 
2.3.1 Worker Incentives 
It was already established that ownership justifies entitlement over residual control and residual income 
from assets. Ownership is however known to affect workers who do not possess control rights. Hart 
(1995) argues that ownership should reside with those who have essential human capital, and when 
asset ownership is appropriated in favour of those with relevant human capital, worker incentives can 
be enhanced with subsequent productivity gains. This in essence is the case for worker equity. Another 
is the case for delegated authority in intermediate forms of organisations. It must be acknowledged 
though that workers who have equity are still better motivated through short-term residual income 
(high-powered incentive) gained from maximising output, whilst management and owners will retain a 
long-term interest. Hence, while worker equity can reduce potential hold-ups by workers, it cannot 
entirely eradicate it.  
 
2.3.2 Equity Finance 
The field of development finance is vast and cannot be extensively addressed here. Some observations 
are possible in this context. Firstly, good entrepreneurs tend to signal successful investments by 
financing such with short-term debt, and less successful entrepreneurs tend to shield risk by using long-
term finance. The implication here is that good investments are those where the entrepreneur has taken 
first financial risk before acquiring long-term debt. Secondly, in case of multiple investors it is 
advantageous to distribute the equity and debt unequally or respectively so the different parties can 
exert pressure that encourages financial performance (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994). Similarly, a firm 
should allocate short- and long-term debt to different investors since the short-term investor will more 
aggressively pursue financial performance and the long-term investor will be the more passive/patient 
investor (Berglöf & von Thaden, 1994). In risky investment schemes, both are necessary. 
 
3. Institutional Economic Appraisal 
3.1 The Embeddedness of Equity Schemes 
Assessing the SC and embeddedness aspects of equity schemes requires firstly, that the motives for the 
formation of this institution be examined. Secondly, the nature of SC and embeddedness will be 
assessed. The alignment of motives to embeddedness/SC will subsequently complete this (first-tier) 
appraisal. The purpose is to assess whether the motives for establishing worker equity schemes is 
adequately predicated on SC and whether the SC is likely to sustain the institution. 
 
3.1.1 Motives 
The motives for embarking on an equity-sharing venture with workers must be assessed on the basis of 
a genuine innovation in the face of transaction costs (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency). The 
institution is primarily prompted by socio-political imperatives for agrarian change towards greater 
equity in land ownership.   The institution thus emerged from an attempt by the landowner to retain or 
secure his asset in the face of political uncertainty. Reciprosity is also alleged to be a motive whereby 
landowners intended to compensate workers for loyalty and sustained contributions to the firm. Its 
coincidence however, with political motives somewhat diminish its importance and lends greater 
weight to politics and the anticipated transaction costs. Attachment value to land (emotional goods) is 
not considered a strong motivator for equity schemes since several of schemes have focussed on new 
land/ventures (i.e. growth oriented) with little emphasis placed on tenure security as a key motivator. 
Security of tenure is instead a consequence of the scheme. Another more meritorious motivation is 
access to alternative markets (e.g. ethical trade). These markets compensate firms for applying ethical 
standards. 
 
3.1.2. The Nature of SC and Embeddedness 
SC can be assessed by looking into: (i) reciprosity and (ii) networks of exchange/engagement. Schmid 
agrees but also argues for it to be considered as sympathy or care (Robinson, et al., 2003; Schmid, 
2003). Reciprosity was treated above (3.1.1.).  The engagement between workers and employers are 
generally embedded in a history of slavery, racial policies, paternalism, land dispossession, 
colonialism, social inequality, social injustice, constrained unionisation, and the like. This in no way 
suggests that equity schemes were all equally disposed to these factors. On the contrary, the evidence 
suggests that equity schemes have a relatively better than average record in this context. The 
landowners are observably entrepreneurial and progressive individuals/firms with a propensity for 
innovation and pragmatism. Whilst there is evidence of positive and above average engagement and   6 
care for labour, the entrepreneurial opportunism of the landowner is by far the key source of innovation 
and energy that brought about this institution. 
 
Trust as an indicator of SC is irrelevant here since the relationship is de facto vertical albeit the fact that 
workers and employers are joint shareholders. Power and authority remains seated with the landowner, 
which if coupled with paternalism is more entrenched. Workers in the initial stages off the venture are 
active in planning and decision-making processes, but their lack of human capital in this domain render 
them increasingly marginalised over time. The initial collectivist orientation, mainly induced by a small 
government subsidy, begins to give way to authoritarian management. This finds form in the leadership 
among workers taking greater responsibility in decision and interfacing with management. Information 
asymmetries grow which lead to collective action problems and in turn erodes the SC among the group. 
Similarly individual in the group become less appreciative of delayed gratification associated with 
bulky investments, which further exacerbates the situation.  The resulting intra-group and inter-partner 
tensions have not induced any further innovations yet, which questions its merit as a genuinely 
evolving institution. This statement may be premature, given that little time has evolved by institutional 
standards. 
 
3.1.3. Aligning Motives to SC 
It clear that some social capital is evident based on the relative traits of workers and landowners 
compared to the rest of the agricultural industry, despite the negative historical embeddedness. 
However, it is abundantly clear that the institutional innovation can mainly be attributed to the 
characteristics of the landowners and their subsequent motivations. The relative lack of human capital 
and cooperative action problems experienced is further testimony to this. Hence, the motives do not 
appear to align with SC. Progressive firms would indulge in ethical trade based on simple cost/benefit 
assessments instead of SC. The institutional innovation as a credible commitment remains in question. 
The arrangement could be interpreted as covert opportunism by landowners to secure their assets in the 
face of uncertainty or enhance their returns in the marketplace. The opportunism is prompted by the 
initial trust of workers who expose their equity (state grants) to such opportunism, given their lack of 
perceived alternatives. 
 
3.2 Governance Aspects 
Appraising governance aspects commences with looking into the nature of the institution. This firstly 
involves an assessment of the extent to which the institutional arrangement resembles a separation of 
ownership and control. This is an acknowledged trend in modern firms and anticipated given the 
accelerated industrialisation of agriculture. Secondly, the agility of the arrangement is examined using 
ICT whereby the incompleteness of the contract is acknowledged. The purpose is to identify, by way of 
reality or conjecture, the incentives required to correct for incompleteness. Finally, the implications for 
empowerment are elicited. 
 
3.2.1. The Nature of the institution 
The commercial agricultural sector has faced economic pressures due to the liberalisation and 
globalisation of trade. This has brought failures (shake-out) as well as sharper competitiveness. Firms 
are perpetually pressured to craft innovations that will enhance global competitiveness.  Equity 
schemes coupled with ethical trade strategies are certainly a relevant innovation in this respect. The 
increased industrialisation has brought the gradual decimation of the traditional family firm and 
producer enterprises in favour of attracting non-traditional capital (Cook, 1995). Equity schemes 
appear consistent with this trend of diversifying the shareholder composition to attract capital amid 
economic pressures. Whilst ownership is diversified, control however is increasingly in the hands of 
specialized managers who wield considerable power and influence, and are often not from the worker 
constituent. Although this arrangement appears best for the firm to maximize shareholder returns, it 
limits the economic development of workers to efficiency gains in labour effort. Efficiency and 
productivity gains are initially evident but is not sustained, nevermind increasing, due to delayed 
gratification problems. This has become a point of contention and frustration for workers. The ability 
of workers as principals (shareholders) to monitor the performance of agents (management) is limited 
for human capital reasons. This asymmetry makes worker shareholders vulnerable to opportunism and 
has fueled distrust especially against a background of racial prejudice. The residual rights and control 
of assets should in modern firms be seated de jure with the shareholders. The  de facto evidence, 
especially from the few failed cases indicates that the residual claims do not realize, upon termination 
or any other stage, partly due to missing markets for such equity. The equity is not easily transferable 
or tradable in the market and when equity is reallocated it is mostly done for financial relief and risk   7 
management. The majority of cases have not shown capital appreciation even by agricultural standards, 
but the exceptions are notable. The model appears consist with the modern trend of separating 
ownership and control. However, the existing human capital and information asymmetries imply that 
workers are vulnerable to opportunism.  Ex ante investment decisions of worker investors are 
subsequently subjected to opportunism in the ex post allocation of residual claims. As discussed earlier, 
trust is not sufficient to control for this especially in an environment that is historically embedded in 
exploitation of low skilled labour. The innovation thus seems better suited to less asymmetric 
situations. 
 
Several observations can be made regarding equity schemes as a means of worker empowerment. First, 
it can be seen as a means of constructive engagement with much space for opportunism given human 
and information asymmetries. Second, in the absence of effective  ex post  monitoring systems, 
opportunism will inevitably manifest given the relative lack of social capital. Third, the model is 
vulnerable to collective action problems mentioned by Olson (1972, 1982) and discussed earlier. 
Fourth, there seems little ‘incentive to alter’ (Bardhan, 2000) the model, so that Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurial internal dynamism (creative destruction) drives economic performance (Best 1990., 
Dietrich,1994). Fifth, government agencies responsible for supporting the model employ individuals 
with ‘low-powered incentives’ (Williamson) to ensure that the model works once supported. 
Subsequently, the model suffers from poor financial performance, worker frustrations, and increased 
dissatisfaction (Karaan, 2002., Tregurtha and Karaan, 2001., Fast, 2000). The problems experienced 
can be summarized as a combination of a lack of internal dynamism, covert opportunism, collective 
action problems and generally incomplete design. The latter specifically refers to the inclusion of high-
powered incentives that encourage entrepreneurship and the problem of missing markets. The most 
important missing market is the market for empowerment equity which once created in the firm can 
hardly be traded in the open (or concessionary) market. 
 
Hart and Moore (1988) propose a timeline for analysing incomplete contracts and governance 
structures. This model is adapted to equity schemes in the figure below. The figure depicts 6 stages of 
contractual evolution which can also be aggregated into an ex ante, ex interim and ex post periods. The 
ex ante period is characterised to the point of the investment. The ex interim period elicits the key 
factors that shows contractual incompleteness of the present situation. This enables the key challenges 
to be identified in the ex post period in an attempt the guide the requisite renegotiation that will deliver 
more appropriate institutions. 
 




st state of nature  Renegotia
tion 
Delivery  Payment 
Ex ante period  Ex interim period  Ex post period 
Landowner offer workers shares 
Coerced worker collectivisation 
Facilitation services 
Obtain state grants 
Equity sharing arrangement                         
Limited worker entrepreneurship 
Human capital by exposure 
Collective action problems 
Eroding of trust and SC 
Institutional rigidity 
Gratification problems 
Mixed financial results 
Suspicions of opportunism  
Lack verifiability 
Asymmetric power 
No counterveiling power 
Unproven residual claims 
Dispersion of expectations 
Labour mobility 
Third party monitoring/enforcement 
Develop counterveiling power 
Adapt grant mechanism 
Entrench residual claims 
Dynamic institutional evolution 
Include incentives for efficacy 
 
 Adapted from Brousseau and Fares, 2000. 
 
3.2.2. Empowerment implications 
Empowerment objectives have not been reached yet despite the initial expressions. The value of the 
acquired asset (shares) has little realised and has not exhibited trade value outside the firm. Real 
ownership as a means of power over residual claims and control has hence not materialised. This may 
also be due to missing markets for such equity, which is unconventional and not generally associated 
with promising financial returns. Empowerment must however be built on adequate human capital 
which remain lacking, despite some improvement due to the experience gained by workers in the 
venture. The heterogeneity of the group is not sufficiently acknowledged as the human capital and 
entrepreneurship can vary considerably. Workers at the lower continuum are frustrated and confused   8 
about the benefits of equity-sharing, whilst those more inclined towards management and 
entrepreneurship feel professionally trapped. This ‘dispersion effect’ is indicative of the need for 
institutional adaptation. 
 
3.3 On Marginal Conditions 
The marginal conditions referred to here relate mainly to those that improve the micro performance of 
the firm. In equity schemes these centre around worker incentives and finance. Equity is expected to be 
a key incentive to encourage trust, productivity, loyalty, commitment and the benefits of worker 
gratification. The absence of worker’s perceived power over residual claims coupled with the short 
horizon of workers for gratification, has dampened these incentives. Worker participation in 
operational, tactical and strategic decision-making occurred, but is reactive and limited by their ability 
to participate effectively at the higher levels. The process (participation) became compromised in 
favour of the product (management targets). Leading workers often clamour for greater management 
responsibility, which indicated a need for greater vertical mobility of professional labour and talented 
workers. Human resource development plans require more attention. 
 
Finance is a key determinant for the establishment of equity schemes, either as state grants or 
concessionary loans. It needs to be established whether schemes are established merely to access these 
funds. The evidence proves that ventures established where the landowner invests first and the rest 
remains bankable, perform better than ventures requiring concessionary funding by necessity. 
Opportunism is also limited in this way. Similarly, equity portfolios including multiple (private) 
investors with differing gratification horizons also perform better, given the respective pressures that 
investors are able to exert. State intervention by way of grants and concessions should thus be 
complimentary to private investment, as opposed to the trigger for empowerment investments. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The institutional economic appraisal conducted in this paper confirms that equity schemes are subject 
to institutional incompleteness as proposed in ICT. The incompleteness stem from the lack of 
verifiability related to social capital, embeddedness, governance and micro performance. In addition, 
they lack the requisite  ex ante incentives to enable  ex post  adaptation, counterveilance over 
opportunism, and the distribution of residual claims and control. The first reason for incompleteness 
emanate from the motivations of the initiators, which is opportunism by landowners to secure their 
assets in the face of uncertainty and/or enhance their returns in the marketplace. The lack of worker 
effort and options in the early stages raises credible commitment questions. Examining the governance 
aspects of equity schemes reveal that they are consistent with modern trends to separate ownership and 
control. However, a key concern is the asymmetry in human capital and subsequently in power, 
residual control, gratification, and ultimately economic empowerment. The analysis is aimed at 
identifying the incentives and innovations required to make equity schemes, as a type of shareholder 
contract, more complete and credible in an empowerment context. Recommendations towards 
institutional innovation are offered below. 
 
5. Recommendations 
5.1 Project selection should favour the following: 
(i)  Proven human and social capital 
(ii)  Bankable irrespective of subsidies 
(iii)  Progressive and entrepreneurial initiators 
(iv)  Accommodate growth and equity approaches 
(v)  Dynamic worker participation from initiation 
 
5.2 Power: Ensure workers have real residual control and rights that can be exercised. It is just as 
important to encourage mechanisms by which workers could develop and exercise counterveiling 
power to offset asymmetries in the allocation of power. 
5.3 Incentives: Introduce ex ante incentives to enable appropriate ex post adaptation and control over 
residual rights. These incentives include 
(i)  Short-term gratification/returns 
(ii)  Upward labour mobility 
(iii)  Human capital investments 
(iv)  Assist talented workers to take advantage of supplementary auxiliary entrepreneurial 
opportunities 
(v)  Encourage ‘dispersion’ in heterogeneous groups   9 
 
5.4 Finance: Ensure projects commence with committed private investment and remains sustainable 
with private funds. Multiple investors constituting a varied investment portfolio should be preferred, 
and this can at best be supplemented by government assisted programmes/institutions. 
5.5 Monitoring: Third party monitoring is required to curtail opportunism, and provide mentoring. 
5.6 Government support: Support should be more varied and flexible to adapt to circumstances initially 
and over time as the project evolves. 
5.7 Models: Equity ventures are but one model and several other models should be sought and allowed 
to emerge from these schemes. 
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